The Role of Incumbent Firms and Universities as Drivers of Innovation: Evidence from the Comparison of the Markets for Anti-cancer and AIDS-treatment Drugs by Sosa, M. Lourdes
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY STUDIES ASSOCATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
The Role of Incumbent Firms and Universities as Drivers of Innovation:  
Evidence from the Comparison of the Markets for 
Anti-cancer and AIDS-treatment Drugs 
 
 
By 
 
M. Lourdes Sosa 
London Business School 
London NW1 4SA, UK 
lsosa@london.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Industry Studies Association 
Working Papers 
 
WP-2008-28 
http://isapapers.pitt.edu/ 
1 
Sosa: The Role of Incumbent Firms and Universities as Drivers of Innovation 
Revised July 14th, 2008 
 
1 
 
The Role of Incumbent Firms and Universities as Drivers of Innovation:    
Evidence from the Comparison of the Markets for Anti-Cancer and AIDS-Treatment 
Drugs 
 
M. Lourdes Sosa 
Strategic and International Management, London Business School, London NW1 4SA, UK, lsosa@london.edu 
 
 
In this paper, I compare the dynamics of two different markets within the pharmaceutical industry: anti-
cancer and AIDS-treatment drugs.  The anti-cancer drug market was born in 1949 and had been in opera-
tion for decades prior to 1983, when the biotechnology revolution first disrupted it.  In contrast, the market 
for AIDS-treatment drugs was born around 1985, during the biotechnology revolution.  This implies that 
incumbents with respect to the biotechnology revolution can only be found in the former market.  Based on 
field interviews, data on patented molecules from the Derwent World Patent Index collection 1994-2004, 
and data on drugs entering clinical trials from the Pharmaprojects database 1989-2004, I examine the dif-
ferences in innovative output (measured in drug molecules per firm) among firms competing in each mar-
ket.  Preliminary results indicate that average productivity is higher in the anti-cancer drug market than in 
the market for AIDS-treatment drugs, but only for the early stages of R&D.  At the point of approval, the 
markets exhibit equal rates.  The reverse is true for differences across technological regimes: the differ-
ences are not significant in early stages but are significant later on.  Lastly, differences in per-firm produc-
tivity are always significant across firm profiles (with incumbents always sustaining the highest rate) 
whereas total proportion of production of innovations is always led by the group of de novo firms.  Univer-
sities do not lead in total proportion of innovations generated, nor do they play a significant role as co-
assignees of other organizations in the generation of patented molecules.  Although this paper offers only 
tentative initial analyses, with further work necessary to implement feedback from participants of the Sloan 
Industry Studies meeting, it has clear potential to contribute to understanding the role that large incumbents 
and universities play in shaping the dynamics of innovation. 
 
Key words: university-industry collaboration; technological change; biotechnology; pharmaceuticals 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1.  Introduction 
At least as far back as Schumpeter (1934, 1950), scholars have been interested in the transition of markets 
through technological discontinuities.  Attention has been focused on the fate of incumbent firms, as dif-
ferent factors determine whether their innovation ability decreases when faced with a new technological 
regime, and whether in spite of that loss of innovation ability, these firms retain significant market share 
as the disruption subsides (see Chesbrough, 2001, for a review).  In contrast, recent research has centered 
on the dynamics surrounding the birth of markets, settings that therefore have no incumbents.  Such re-
search has been particularly fruitful in furthering our understanding of the differences in innovative ability 
between entrants to a market that have a pre-history (i.e., diversifying entrants also referred to as de alio 
firms) and those that do not (i.e., de novo firms).  Studies in this recent tradition have spanned medical 
devices (Mitchell, 1994), automobiles (Carroll et al., 1996), and television sets (Klepper and Simons, 
2000).   
In light of the studies in both traditions mentioned above, contrasting inferences have been made about 
the impact of established firms, either incumbents or diversifying firms (i.e., entrants with a pre-history), 
on total market-level innovative output.  On the one hand, in creative destruction incumbents have been 
found to lose productivity in the research and development (R&D) of products under the new technologi-
cal regime (Henderson, 1993), even if they do not ultimately lose the market (Tripsas, 1997).  Therefore, 
the suspicion is that these firms do not easily cope with technological discontinuities, and in the presence 
of barriers to entry and exit, they slow down the innovative progress of the market as it transitions 
through the discontinuity.  On the other hand, in studies where the technological discontinuity marks the 
birth of the market, diversifying firms have been found to outperform de novo firms (i.e., newly born 
firms) in several dimensions, including survival (e.g., Mitchell, 1994; Carroll et al., 1996) and new prod-
uct introductions (e.g., Methe, Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 1996).  Therefore, it seems natural to infer 
that these firms indeed stimulate the innovative progress of the market. 
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Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether the contrasting roles that established firms can have 
in the innovative progress of a market are a result of the research design employed and the unavailability 
of fine-grained datasets.  Indeed, recent creative destruction research has found that once entrants are 
separated into diversifying and de novo firms as well, the difference between the innovative performance 
of the two firm categories with a pre-history, namely incumbents and diversifying entrants, is not signifi-
cant, and that the main gap exists between established and de novo firms (Sosa, 2005, 2006).  Therefore, 
the explanatory variable for the different findings of incumbents and diversifying entrants in transitioning 
vs. emerging markets could be attributed to differences in market characteristics. 
In this study, I set out to compare two markets that constitute an ideal matched pair due precisely to 
their differences and similarities.  On the one hand, these markets differ in the point in their life cycles at 
which the technological discontinuity is impacting them (a transition after decades of a previous techno-
logical regime for one and the birth of the other).  This characteristic allows me to contrast a market with 
incumbent firms in transition (the former case) versus a market without incumbents (the latter case).  On 
the other hand, these markets are similar in a number of key dimensions: both include diversifying and de 
novo entrants; both are among the most science-intensive markets within the pharmaceutical industry; 
both are facing the same technological discontinuity, that is, the biotechnology revolution; both have low 
price sensitivity and are far from satiation in the areas of efficacy and safety that consumers value; and 
both have involved a significant amount of university research in the history of their progress. 
Beyond the matched pair that these particular empirical settings represent, I incorporate in this study a 
uniquely fine-grained level of measurement of innovation.  In order to further understand the innovative 
output of these firm categories under contrasting market structures, I measure innovative output at three 
different points of the R&D process of a firm in this industry: the generation of patented drug molecules; 
the entry of some of those molecules into clinical trials; and the approval of some of those molecules after 
successful completion of clinical trials. 
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In preliminary results, I find that the average innovative output per firm is higher in the anti-cancer drug 
market than in the market for AIDS-treatment drugs only for early-stage research.  At the point of ap-
proval, both markets sustain the same average rate per firm.  Furthermore, when I distinguish within the 
anti-cancer drug market (the only one in transition) between the old (cytotoxic) technology for drug dis-
covery and the new (targeted), I find no differences in the average rate of production across the technolo-
gies in the early stages of R&D (prior to clinical trials), but significant differences in the later stages (en-
tering clinical trials).  This is true for all firm profiles.  Nonetheless, the difference in rate of production of 
innovations is significant across firm profiles at all stages, with incumbents leading with the highest per-
firm average.  Lastly, I look at the co-assignment of patents for drug molecules and find that public or-
ganizations (universities and governmental laboratories) do not, in absolute numbers, account for the 
largest proportion of activity.  De novo firms as a group account for the largest proportion of innovations 
in the earliest stage, even if per firm their rate of production is the lowest.  Beyond their role as producers 
of early-stage innovations, universities do not seem to play a formal role as co-assignees with other firms, 
with their proportion of formal collaboration with incumbents and diversifying firms being negligible in 
both markets.  It must be the case then that universities are either fully transferring all property rights to 
these established firms when they collaborate, or contributing to their R&D efforts through a less formal 
mechanism. 
Although the research exercise presented is a work in progress and as such has significant limitations, if 
corroborated by further work, it should represent significant implications for our understanding of the role 
that incumbents and universities play in shaping the dynamics of innovation. 
2.  Empirical Setting  
In order to analyze the contribution that incumbent firms make to market dynamics, I present in this paper 
a comparison of two contrasting market structures.  The first is the market for anti-cancer drugs, a market 
that was in place long before the biotechnology revolution first disrupted it in 1983 and that therefore has 
had a set of market incumbents transitioning into biotechnology.  In contrast, the second market is the 
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market for AIDS-treatment drugs, a market that was born during the biotechnology revolution and that 
therefore has no market incumbents.  These two markets offer a reasonable match for a paired design be-
cause they coincide in several of their primary characteristics, two of which are of particular interest in 
this paper.  These two markets are science-intensive, which means that the research of the application it-
self (i.e., the therapeutic category) is as complex and value-adding as any of the technological platforms 
used in drug discovery and development (see also Weinberg, 1996, for the case of the anti-cancer drug 
market, and Kanki and Essex, 2005, for the case of the AIDS-treatment drug market).  Since prior re-
search (Sosa, 2008) has identified the complexity of the application-specific knowledge as a key driver in 
the dynamics of innovation in the transition of drug development into the biotechnology revolution, 
avoiding variance in this characteristic was of utmost importance.  Furthermore, both markets have low 
price sensitivity, and are far from satiation on the part of consumers in terms of efficacy and safety, the 
two main aspects of merit in most pharmaceuticals.1 
I offer next further detail on these markets, their timelines and their measures. 
4.1. The Anti-Cancer Drug Market   
Although this market has long been in existence, the technological regime preceding the biotechnology 
revolution, namely cytotoxic drug development (commonly referred to as “chemotherapy”), started in 
1949 (Chabner and Roberts, 2005).  I took the approval of the first anti-cancer drug influenced by bio-
technology, Intron-A®, introduced in 1983, as the start of the biotechnology discontinuity.  In 1983, the 
anti-cancer drug market began its transition from cytotoxic agents (e.g., alkylating agents, etc.) to the 
radically new category termed targeted drugs (e.g., tyrosine kinase inhibitors, etc.).  In order to analyze 
the dynamics of innovation in this market, it is important to characterize the transition in terms of the 
comparison of the technological regimes used in cytotoxic vs. targeted drug R&D.  The first question is 
whether the difference between the technological paradigms is incremental or radical (Henderson and 
                                                          
1 For an example of an exception to this feature within pharmaceuticals, see Christensen (1996). 
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Clark, 1990).2  A second though related question is whether the difference is competence-destroying to 
the resources and capabilities that market incumbents have mastered in the R&D operations within their 
standing value chains (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).3  Studies have shown that the transition from cyto-
toxic to targeted R&D in anti-cancer drugs has been a radical and competence-destroying change to this 
market (Rang, 2006: 49),4 albeit only to the preclinical (i.e., drug discovery) phase of R&D.  A descrip-
tion of a representative value chain in this market is shown in Figure 1, where drug discovery can be iden-
tified.  The description of this technological change as radical and competence-destroying is consistent 
with the responses of interviewees in this study and with the description offered in prior literature about 
biotechnology’s impact on the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999; 
Rothaermel, 2001).     
R&D Process 
Drug Discovery (Preclinical) Development (Clinical) 
Target 
Selection 
Target 
Validation 
Lead 
Finding 
Lead  
Optimization 
Animal 
Studies Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Commercialization 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Representative Value Chain in the Pharmaceutical Industry. 
Adapted from Rang (2006: 44). 
 
As mentioned above, it was important to select a pair of markets where consumers were far from satia-
tion in the main dimensions of product merit.  In the case of the anti-cancer drug market, that implied that 
the change, although a radical shift in technologies and competence-destroying to incumbents’ value 
                                                          
2  In the case of assembled products, a further characterization would be needed to identify whether only the compo-
nents are changing (modular change) or only the architecture is changing (architectural change). 
3  I refer to the contrast between incremental vs. radical and competence-destroying vs. competence-enhancing as 
related because some of their categories could be superimposed: incremental changes are competence-enhancing, 
whereas it could be argued that modular, architectural, and radical are all competence-destroying to varying degrees. 
4  Accounts of the development of targeted anti-cancer drugs also illustrate this point (e.g., Capdeville et al., 2002). 
Investigational 
New Drug (IND)   
Application 
New Drug       
Application 
(NDA) Process 
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chain, should be “sustaining” in customer preferences (Christensen, 1997).  According to data by the 
American Cancer Society (2000), at the start of the discontinuity (and indeed for the full period of obser-
vation in this study) the market was far from satiation in levels of efficacy and safety, the main dimen-
sions of merit considered in an anti-cancer drug.  Indeed, the 5-year survival rate had changed from 50% 
in the years 1974-1976, to 51% in the years 1980-1982, to 59% in the years 1989-1995, a trend that 
proves the market in general was far from satiation (even though the difference in rates between 1974-
1976 and 1989-1995 is statistically significant at p<0.05).  Customer preferences were clearly the maxi-
mization of efficacy and safety, with ample room for improvement in those dimensions by any firm in 
competition.   
Market-Specific Explanatory Variables in the Anti-Cancer Drug Market 
Anti-Cancer Drug Market Incumbents These firms must have been present in the market for cytotoxic 
anti-cancer drugs before the era of biotechnology, and they must have been venturing into targeted anti-
cancer drugs in the years under examination.5  Since the era of chemotherapy (i.e., cytotoxic anti-cancer 
drugs) in cancer treatment started in the 1940s (Chabner and Roberts, 2005), most records are incom-
plete.6  I therefore triangulated three different sources to identify incumbent firms: the records available 
from the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) on all approved drugs;7 the records available on anti-cancer 
                                                          
5 This implied that I would select incumbents contingent on investment in the radically new technology (i.e., a sub-
set of all incumbents).  In the end, this restriction made no difference because all incumbents still in the market by 
1983 had invested in the new technology.  Furthermore, all incumbents invested in the new technology from the 
start of the revolution. 
6 For example, FDA records for drug approval are incomplete before 1982, mainly because this was prior to the ap-
proval of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 [the Hatch-Waxman Act], which 
gave rise to today’s generics drug industry.  
7 From Drugs@FDA, available electronically at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/. 
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drugs in particular from the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (FDA-CDER);8 and the 
printed collection of the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) drug directories for the years 1947-2005.  I 
took the approval of the first anti-cancer drug influenced by biotechnology, Intron-A® (a recombinant-
DNA molecule), introduced in 1983, as the start of the era of targeted anti-cancer drugs.  An incumbent 
therefore would be a firm that was present in the market before 1983 and that after 1983 had at least one 
targeted anti-cancer drug either in clinical trials or already launched.  Firms that were in the market but 
left for a significant period of time and were returning because of the biotechnology revolution were not 
considered incumbents but diversifying entrants.9  I therefore further corroborated the presence of the 
firms around 1983 by requiring that at least one of the cytotoxic anti-cancer drugs for the firm in question 
still generated revenue after 1983.  I estimated this through one of two different proxies: at least one of 
the cytotoxic anti-cancer drugs for the firm in question must have had revenues listed in the Med Ad 
News’ yearly report of Top Prescription Drugs in the period 1991-2002, or must have had a generic in-
troduction after the generics industry took off in 1984.10 
Anti-Cancer Drug Market Diversifying vs. De Novo Entrants The identification of these two categories 
was done through access to their corporate histories, culled mainly from their company websites.  Firms 
that had a pre-history prior to their incursion into the anti-cancer drug market were classified as diversify-
ing entrants, regardless of whether they continued their presence in markets other than anti-cancer drugs 
during their incursion into this market.  I defined a “pre-history” strictly as a prior stream of revenue.  
Therefore, entrants that experimented with different therapeutic categories were still classified as de novo 
                                                          
8 From FDA-CDER Oncology Tools, available electronically at http://www.fda.gov/cder/cancer/druglistframe.htm.  
9 For example, Merck made two attempts to enter the anti-cancer drug market with Nitrogen Mustards Mustargen® 
and Cosmegen® in the years 1949 and 1966, respectively, but was by 1983 long gone from the market.  Neither 
product had significant sales by 1983.  Cosmegen is even reported as unprofitable in Merck’s Annual Report in 
1951. As Merck was attempting to enter the anti-cancer drug market again, it is classified as a diversifying entrant. 
10 I assume that only anti-cancer drugs with positive revenues will incite generic competition. 
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entrants.  In contrast, entrants that derived a revenue stream from any other business (e.g., medical de-
vices or research services) were classified as diversifying entrants, even if the firm itself was rather young 
and small. 
4.2. The Market for AIDS-Treatment Drugs   
As mentioned above, in contrast to the anti-cancer drug market, the market for AIDS-treatment drugs was 
born during the biotechnology revolution.  According to the USA Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC, 2007), HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) was first identified in the United States in 
1981.  Although the deadly disease was first described as a rare pneumonia, by December 1982 publica-
tions would refer to the disease as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  Indeed, according to 
scientific accounts, although the virus responsible for the disease was a genetic relative of a known virus, 
it had been recently introduced to humans from a primate reservoir (Essex and Kanki, 1988).  This par-
ticular characteristic makes the market for AIDS-treatment drugs a perfect contrasting market to the anti-
cancer drug market: although demand for cancer treatment had existed long before the transition into bio-
technology and in fact demand had existed long before supply started to become available, the market for 
AIDS-treatment drugs had neither supply nor demand prior to 1982.  Interest in researching the applica-
tion-side of R&D in the AIDS-treatment drug market grew rapidly as did the availability of public fund-
ing for this research (Kanki and Essex, 2005), and by 1984, HIV was recognized as the etiologic agent 
that causes AIDS.  As the application-side of the R&D of this market evolved, so did specific applications 
of technological platforms (e.g., polymerase chain reaction [PCR]).  By 1985, for example, the first blood 
test to identify antibodies to the virus and hence diagnose the disease (namely, the ELISA test) was finally 
available (CDC, 2006).   
Market-Specific Explanatory Variables in the AIDS-Treatment Drug Market 
As mentioned above, this market itself had no pre-history, that is, the market had not existed in a prior 
technological regime.  Indeed, the consumer need itself did not exist prior to 1981 since this specific dis-
ease is a recent genetic mutation transferred to humans from the animal world.  This implies that there are 
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no incumbent firms in this market, and that there are no contrasting technological regimes in the history 
of the market.  The only market-specific explanatory variable, therefore, is the differentiation of diversify-
ing and de novo entrants, and I describe this next. 
AIDS-Treatment Drug Market Diversifying vs. De Novo Entrants The identification of these two cate-
gories was also done through access to their corporate histories, again culled mainly from their company 
websites.  Firms that had a pre-history prior to their incursion into the AIDS-treatment drug market were 
classified as diversifying entrants, regardless of whether they continued their presence in other markets.  
As with the anti-cancer drug market, I defined a “pre-history” strictly as a prior stream of revenue.   
4.3. Nonmarket-Specific Quantitative Measures   
For the comparison of the two above-mentioned markets, I had to use a series of variables that are firm-
specific but not market-specific (i.e., in the above sections, the same firm could be an incumbent with re-
spect to the anti-cancer drug market, but a diversifying entrant with respect to the AIDS-treatment drug 
market).  I describe these nonmarket-specific variables next.   
Dependent Variables 
Number of Patented Drug Molecules According to the value chain presented in Figure 1 above, a firm 
in the pharmaceutical industry, whether in anti-cancer or AIDS-treatment drug development, will generate 
many new drug molecules during the drug discovery stages, and patent them at different points though 
always prior to starting the transition toward clinical trials, since this transition implies disclosure.  In or-
der to measure this step, I used Thomson Scientific’s Derwent World Patent Index (DWPI) database.  The 
DWPI database consists of innovation records identified through the categorization of patents into prede-
termined classes (identified by a code) by expert librarians.  Patents are collected from the 40 largest ju-
risdictions, and the classification process includes the matching of patents containing the same idea to the 
same innovation record.  Therefore, the unit of analysis is the innovation, and each record can be matched 
to one or several granted patents.  Because the classes are defined by the librarians themselves, anti-
cancer and AIDS-treatment drugs are defined, but other therapeutic classes are not.  Furthermore, anti-
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cancer and AIDS-treatment drugs are defined starting only in 1994, so this measure can only be made in 
the window of 1994-2004.  In the case of anti-cancer drugs, it was important to also differentiate between 
the two technological regimes.  I therefore differentiated between standard chemotherapy (i.e., cytotoxic 
anti-cancer drugs) and biotech-based drug development (i.e., targeted anti-cancer drugs) through further 
use of the DWPI codes.  In fieldwork, interviewees had described the different subclasses contained 
within cytotoxic vs. targeted drugs in anti-cancer research (e.g., interleukins and tyrosine kinase inhibitors 
among targeted drugs).  Therefore, I identified all codes pointing to sub-classes of targeted anti-cancer 
drugs, to then aggregate to the technological regime. 
Number of Drug Molecules Introduced in Clinical Trials Continuing along the value chain presented in 
Figure 1 above, after the generation of new drug molecules during the drug discovery stages, a sub-set of 
these drug molecules will enter clinical trials.  In order to examine this transition, I collected data on all 
drugs that entered clinical trials for treatment of cancer and AIDS, as reported in the Pharmaprojects da-
tabase.  This database starts in 1989 and records all drugs launched into clinical trials worldwide along 
with their histories, as represented through press releases.  In the case of anti-cancer drugs, I further dif-
ferentiated between the old and new technology, namely cytotoxic and targeted anti-cancer drugs, through 
the dummy “targeted.”  I again did this by measuring first two sub-classes of targeted drugs, in this case 
targeted small molecules and targeted large molecules, to then assess the full category of targeted drugs.  
The identification of targeted large-molecule anti-cancer drugs is reliably documented in the Pharmapro-
jects database.  To identify targeted small molecules, I selected all small molecule drugs with mechanisms 
of action described in industry reports (Bear Sterns, 2002; Stephens Inc., 2002; UBS Warburg, 2001) and 
in interviews as targeted in anti-cancer drug R&D (in the end, mainly comprising angiogenesis and kinase 
inhibitors).   
Number of Drug Molecules Approved for Market Launch At the end of the R&D process depicted in the 
value chain shown in Figure 1, a sub-set of drugs in clinical trials is granted approval to launch on the 
market (even though it remains discretionary to the firm how much later and through which channels to 
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commercialize the innovation).  I measured this through the full collection of Thomson Scientific’s Phy-
sicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) annual directory of approved drugs, 1947-2004.  Although a full record of 
approved drugs can be requested from the FDA, for example, as mentioned in the definition of anti-cancer 
drug market incumbents, the information is often incomplete prior to 1984, the year when the Hatch-
Waxman Act entered into effect.  Hence, the use of the PDR collection granted further systematic cover-
age.  In order to differentiate between cytotoxic and targeted anti-cancer drugs, I again used the informa-
tion in the PDR collection to classify drugs into sub-classes of targeted drugs to then aggregate. 
Nonmarket-Specific Explanatory Variables 
Public Research Organizations In contrast to the firm categories I specified in each market, the classifi-
cation of nonprofit organizations was not market-specific.  I therefore distinguished only between private 
and public research with the dummy variable “public research,” which spanned all nonprofit organiza-
tional arrangements, including universities, government laboratories, and nongovernmental organizations. 
5. Preliminary Analyses 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics   
In preliminary analyses, significant differences can be seen in the trends of innovative output both across 
the different stages of the R&D pipeline, and in each stage across firm categories and technological re-
gimes.   
Figure 2 below shows simply the contrast of approved drugs between the two markets in the history of 
their evolution.  Although there is a marked fluctuation in the anti-cancer drug market around 1971, this is 
mostly due to a change in the accounting of pain medication as a cancer-only adjuvant in the PDR collec-
tion that served as the information source.   
Table 1 presents the total number of drugs at each of the three stages in the R&D pipeline of both mar-
kets. 
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Figure 2: History of Available Drugs per Year for Cancer and AIDS Treatment,  
according to the Physician Desk Reference Collection 
     
Table 1: Total Number of Drugs Generated per R&D Stage across both Markets 
 Patented 
Molecules 
Drugs in 
Clinical Trials Approved Drugs 
Anti-Cancer 55,242 6,851 307 (since 1949) 
122 
(since 1983) 
AIDS-Treatment 3,168 1,244 56 
 
The increase in the number of molecules in earlier stages (i.e., the comparison of the volume of pat-
ented molecules versus those entering clinical trials) shown in Table 1 is partly explained by the expanded 
coverage that the sample of firms based on patented drug molecules generates.  Many firms from devel-
oping countries (e.g., Mexico, India, Tanzania) appear in this early-stage sample and do not appear in 
later stages, either because their drugs do not make it into clinical trials (due to regulatory or firm-specific 
decisions), or because these drugs do not require an official clinical trial (i.e., complementary and alterna-
tive medicine). 
Figure 3 presents the gap in innovative output between the two markets as it widens over time, as meas-
ured at the first stage in this study, namely patented molecules in early-stage R&D. 
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Figure 3: Gap in Innovative Output between the Anti-Cancer and AIDS-Treatment Markets over Time,  
as Measured in Early-Stage R&D (Generation of Patented Drug Molecules) 
 
Indeed, the gap in innovative output is sustained across the years in the period of observation, not only 
in terms of absolute volume of drugs but also in terms of per-firm productivity, as seen in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Persistent Gap between the Average Innovative Output of Firms in the Anti-Cancer and AIDS-Treatment 
Drug Markets, as measured in the Generation of Patented Molecules in Early-Stage R&D 
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5.2. Initial Analyses   
Table 2 below presents the differences in the per-firm rate of production of innovations at each stage of 
R&D analyzed.  As can be seen, the per-firm output for the anti-cancer drug market is higher than that of 
the AIDS-treatment market only for early-stage research.  The difference disappears at the point of ap-
proval. 
Table 2: Rate of Production of Innovations per Firm per R&D Stage  
for the Anti-Cancer and AIDS-Treatment Drug Markets 
 
 Patented Molecules Drugs in Clinical Trials Approved Drugs 
Anti-Cancer  
Drug Market 29.9 5.4 1.5 
AIDS-Treatment 
Drug Market 7.2 3.7 1.5 
 between-market diff+ between-market diff**  
 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3 distinguishes the different firm profiles, emphasizing the fact that the profiles are market-
specific.  Per-firm average rate of production of innovations is significantly different across firm profiles 
in both R&D stages measured, as can be seen with two different specifications: a simple OLS, and a 
Negative Binomial, which accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is a count.  In future work, a 
Cox regression with repeated events per firm will be implemented to account for the possibility of a time-
varying rate of production of innovations as done in prior work (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). 
Table 4 then distinguishes within the anti-cancer drug market (the only one in transition) between the 
old technology (cytotoxic) for drug discovery and the new one (targeted therapies).  As can be seen, I find 
no differences in the per-firm average rate of production across the technologies in the early stages of 
R&D (prior to clinical trials): the coefficients for “targeted” and for the interactions “anti-cancer incum-
bent x targeted” and “anti-cancer diversifying x targeted” are all not significantly different from zero.   
Nonetheless, the differences across technologies are significant in the later stages (entering clinical trials) 
for all firm profiles.   
 
16 
Sosa: The Role of Incumbent Firms and Universities as Drivers of Innovation 
Revised July 14th, 2008 
 
 
  
Table 3: Rate of Production of Innovations per Firm Profile per R&D Stage  
(Note: differences in coefficients are all significant; anti-cancer novo firms are the omitted category) 
 
Patented Molecules Drugs in Clinical Trials  
OLS Neg. Binomial OLS Neg. Binomial 
Constant 21.0* (8.7) 
3.0*** 
(0.4) 
3.8*** 
(0.5) 
1.3*** 
(0.1) 
AIDS-Treatment Diversifying 7.9 (10.5) 
0.32 
(0.5) 
4.6** 
(1.8) 
0.8*** 
(0.2) 
AIDS-Treatment Novo -16.7* (8.74) 
-1.59*** 
(0.5) 
-0.5 
(0.7) 
-0.1 
(0.2) 
Anti-Cancer Incumbent 638.1*** (109.6) 
3.45*** 
(0.4) 
91.8*** 
(22.5) 
3.2*** 
(0.3) 
Anti-Cancer Diversifying 58.5** (18.9) 
1.33** 
(0.5) 
8.8*** 
(1.8) 
1.2*** 
(0.2) 
 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4: Rate of Production of Innovations per Firm Profile per Technology per R&D Stage  
(Note: differences in coefficients are all significant; anti-cancer cytotoxic novo firms are the omitted category) 
 
Patented Molecules Drugs in Clinical Trials  
OLS Neg. Binomial OLS Neg. Binomial 
Constant 14.3** 2.6*** 3.4*** 1.2*** 
AIDS-Treatment Diversifying 2.4 0.1 5.0** 0.9*** 
AIDS-Treatment Novo -10.2* -1.3*** -0.1 -0.0 
Anti-Cancer Incumbent 388.9*** 3.3*** 84.6*** 3.2*** 
Anti-Cancer Diversifying 28.6** 1.1** 8.2*** 1.2*** 
Targeted -1.6 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 
Anti-Cancer Incumbent X Targeted 145.7+ -0.4 -79.7*** -2.2*** 
Anti-Cancer Diversifying X Targeted 3.7 0.1 -6.7*** -0.8** 
 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Lastly, Table 5 shows the co-assignment of patents for drug molecules across all firm profiles.  Notice 
that public organizations (universities and governmental laboratories) do not represent the largest propor-
tion of activity in these markets in absolute numbers.  De novo firms as a group account for the largest 
proportion of innovations in the earliest stage, even if per firm their rate of production is the lowest.  Fur-
thermore, universities do not seem to play a formal role as co-assignees with other firms, with their pro-
portion of formal collaboration with established firms (both incumbents and diversifying entrants) being 
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negligible in both markets (a total of 0.4% for the AIDS-treatment drug market, and 0.5% for the anti-
cancer drug market).   
Table 5: Co-Assignments among Firm Profiles across Markets 
 
AIDS-Treatment Anti-Cancer 
 Number of 
Molecules % 
Number of 
Molecules % 
Novo 1,778 56.1% 23,467 47.9% 
Diversifying 875 27.6% 10,462 21.4% 
Public 317 10.0% 6,158 12.6% 
Incumbent   5,045 10.3% 
Novo-Public 79 2.5% 1,525 3.1% 
Diversifying-Novo 87 2.7% 1,077 2.2% 
Incumbent-Novo   358 0.7% 
Diversifying-Public 12 0.4% 154 0.3% 
Diversifying-Incumbent   146 0.3% 
Incumbent-Public   77 0.2% 
Other 20 0.6% 511 1.0% 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
Although the analyses of the project outlined in this paper, presented at the Sloan Industry Studies Con-
ference 2008, is still in progress, initial analyses provide evidence of the advantages that the uniquely 
paired market design along with fine-grain measurement of R&D output can offer to studies of the drivers 
of innovation.  In future work, significant feedback collected from Sloan Industry Studies participants will 
be incorporated to corroborate the findings and clarify the mechanisms behind them. 
There are significant potential implications of this study, after further work corroborates its findings.  
The first implication is connected to the significant differences across the two markets in rates of produc-
tion of innovations in early-stage R&D but not at time of approval.  Such pattern might identify an addi-
tional consequence from the presence of an intensification of the use of science (as opposed to trial-and-
error experimentation) in recent decades.  Prior research (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) has argued that 
the main consequence of the “scientification” of R&D is a disruption to the standing division of labor in 
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industrial R&D and thus to the availability of R&D outsourcing.  Nonetheless, such “scientification” 
might also have consequences for R&D productivity that are not linked to outsourcing strategies.   
Furthermore, the reverse result when comparing the rates of production of innovations between the two 
technological regimes across firm profiles, with negligible differences in the productivity rates of differ-
ent firm groups in early-stage R&D but significant differences later on can also have important implica-
tions.  This result might shed some light on the differences in the strategies pursued by established firms, 
for whom the new technology represents a transition, as compared to the strategies of their de novo coun-
terparts, for whom the new technology represents the first stage of their corporate history.   
Lastly, documenting the extent and nature of the R&D collaborations of universities with for-profit 
firms has the potential to extend prior research (Murray, 2002; Edwards, Murray, and Yu, 2003) that has 
analyzed the similar or different roles that these institutions play in the dynamics of industry and of sci-
ence. 
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